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11 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
12 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

13 VANCOUVER ALUMNI ASSET  
14 HOLDINGS INC., Individually and on  
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,

15 Plaintiffs,

16 v.

17 DAIMLER AG, DIETER ZETSCHKE,  
18 BODO UEBBER, and THOMAS  
WEBER,

19 Defendants.

Master File No. 16-cv-02942-DSF-KS

Judge: Hon. Dale S. Fischer

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND**  
**AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF**  
**LEAD PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR**  
**FINAL APPROVAL OF PROPOSED**  
**CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND**  
**PLAN OF ALLOCATION**

20 MARIA MUNRO, Individually and on  
21 Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,

22 Plaintiffs,

23 v.

24 DAIMLER AG, DIETER ZETSCHKE,  
25 BODO UEBBER, and THOMAS  
WEBER,

26 Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-03412-DSF-KS

Hearing:

Date: December 14, 2020  
Time: 1:30 p.m.  
Place: Courtroom 7D  
Judge: Hon. Dale S. Fischer

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1           Lead Plaintiff, the Public School Retirement System of the School District  
2 of Kansas City, Missouri (“Lead Plaintiff” or “Kansas City”), by its counsel  
3 Labaton Sucharow LLP (“Lead Counsel”), respectfully submits this memorandum  
4 of points and authorities in support of its motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil  
5 Procedure 23(e), requesting: (i) final approval of the proposed Settlement of this  
6 class action (the “Action”); (ii) approval of the proposed plan of allocation for the  
7 proceeds of the Settlement (the “Plan of Allocation”); and (iii) final certification  
8 of the Settlement Class.<sup>1</sup>

### 9   **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**

10           Subject to Court approval, Lead Plaintiff has agreed to settle all claims in  
11 the Action, and related claims, in exchange for a payment of \$19,000,000. Lead  
12 Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, entered into the  
13 Settlement with all of the defendants in the Action: Daimler AG (“Daimler” or the  
14 “Company”), and Dieter Zetsche (“Zetsche”), Bodo Uebber (“Uebber”), and  
15 Thomas Weber (“Weber”) (collectively, the “Individual Defendants” and, with  
16 Daimler, the “Defendants”). Lead Plaintiff respectfully submits that the proposed  
17 Settlement is a very good result for the Settlement Class and easily satisfies the  
18 standards for final approval under Rule 23(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil  
19 Procedure.

20           At the time the agreement to settle was reached, Lead Plaintiff and Lead  
21 Counsel had a well-developed understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of  
22 the Action. Before the Settlement was agreed to, Lead Counsel had: (i) conducted  
23 an extensive investigation into the alleged fraud; (ii) drafted and filed a detailed  
24 amended complaint based on Lead Counsel’s investigation; (iii) engaged in  
25

26 <sup>1</sup> All capitalized terms used herein are defined in the Stipulation and  
27 Agreement of Settlement, dated April 20, 2020 (the “Stipulation,” ECF No. 310-  
28 3), amended by the Agreement Regarding Amendments to the Stipulation and  
Agreement of Settlement, dated September 14, 2020 (“Agreement Regarding  
Amendments,” ECF No. 324-1), and have the same meanings as set forth therein.



1 extensive briefing on Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal  
2 jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(2), as well  
3 as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6); (iv)  
4 engaged in extensive briefing and oral arguments related to a contentious and  
5 lengthy sealed discovery dispute; (v) prepared briefing on Defendants’ appeal of  
6 Magistrate Judge Stevenson’s Order regarding the sealed discovery dispute; (vi)  
7 worked closely with multiple experts in the fields of diesel emissions, automotive  
8 emissions regulations, data privacy, and loss causation and damages issues; and  
9 (vii) engaged in extensive arm’s-length settlement negotiations, including a formal  
10 mediation session before the Honorable Daniel Weinstein of JAMS (the  
11 “Mediator”), with assistance from Ambassador (ret.) David Carden. *See generally*  
12 Declaration of James W. Johnson in Support of (I) Lead Plaintiff’s Motion for  
13 Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Plan of Allocation and (II) Lead  
14 Counsel’s Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Payment of Expenses (the  
15 “Johnson Declaration” or “Johnson Decl.”), filed herewith.<sup>2</sup>

16 While Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel continue to believe that the claims  
17 asserted against Defendants are strong, they recognize that the Action presented a  
18 number of substantial risks that could negatively impact Lead Plaintiff’s ability to  
19 establish the liability of Defendants, including challenges in establishing the  
20 falsity of Defendants’ statements and whether they were made with requisite  
21 intent to deceive investors and commit securities fraud. Even if Lead Plaintiff  
22

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23 <sup>2</sup> The Johnson Declaration is an integral part of this submission and, for the  
24 sake of brevity in this memorandum, the Court is respectfully referred to it for a  
25 detailed description of, *inter alia*: the history of the Action; the nature of the  
26 claims asserted; the negotiations leading to the Settlement; and the risks and  
27 uncertainties of continued litigation, among other things. Citations to “¶” in this  
28 memorandum refer to paragraphs in the Johnson Declaration.

29 All exhibits herein are annexed to the Johnson Declaration. For clarity,  
30 citations to exhibits that themselves have attached exhibits will be referenced as  
31 “Ex. \_\_\_ - \_\_\_.” The first numerical reference is to the designation of the entire  
32 exhibit attached to the Declaration and the second reference is to the exhibit  
33 designation within the exhibit itself.



1 were able to establish liability, it would have faced significant hurdles in proving  
2 loss causation and damages if Defendants’ arguments were credited by the Court  
3 or a jury and certain alleged disclosures were excluded as a consequence.  
4 Defendants would also likely argue that, even if the alleged disclosures were  
5 corrective and caused statistically significant price declines, there were credible  
6 arguments and evidence showing that a significant portion of the price declines  
7 resulted from forces unrelated to the alleged fraud (*i.e.* “disaggregation” of non-  
8 fraud related information would be required). Finally, damages could be reduced  
9 significantly if Defendants succeeded in arguing that investors’ acquisitions of  
10 certain of the securities at issue—in particular, Daimler Global Registered Shares  
11 (“GRS”), which are global shares of a foreign issuer not sold on any U.S.  
12 exchange and which are connected to the U.S. only by their trading on the U.S.  
13 over-the-counter (“OTC”) market—do not qualify as domestic transactions  
14 subject to the Exchange Act under *Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank*, 561 U.S. 247  
15 (2010).

16 Given these risks, a recovery of \$19 million represents a very favorable  
17 result for the Settlement Class, and avoids the risks and delays associated with  
18 pursuing the Action through class certification, summary judgment, trial, and  
19 appeals, a process that could take years. In light of these considerations, Lead  
20 Plaintiff and Lead Counsel respectfully submit that the Settlement is fair,  
21 reasonable, and adequate and warrants final approval by the Court.

22 Additionally, Lead Plaintiff requests that the Court approve the proposed  
23 Plan of Allocation, which was set forth in the Notice mailed to potential  
24 Settlement Class Members. The Plan of Allocation, which was developed by  
25 Lead Plaintiff’s damages expert in consultation with Lead Counsel, provides a  
26 reasonable method for allocating the Net Settlement Fund among Settlement Class  
27 Members who submit claims.

28

1                   **PRELIMINARY APPROVAL AND THE NOTICE PROGRAM**

2                   On September 22, 2020, the Court entered an order preliminarily approving  
3 the Settlement and approving the proposed forms and methods of providing notice  
4 to the Settlement Class (the “Preliminary Approval Order”, ECF No. 325).  
5 Pursuant to and in compliance with the Preliminary Approval Order, through  
6 records maintained by Daimler and information provided by brokerage firms and  
7 other nominees, beginning on October 6, 2020, the Court-appointed Claims  
8 Administrator A.B. Data, Ltd. (“A.B. Data”), caused, among other things, the  
9 Notice and Claim Form (together, the “Notice Packet”) to be mailed by first-class  
10 mail to potential Settlement Class Members. *See* Declaration of Adam D. Walter  
11 Regarding: (A) Mailing of the Notice; (B) Publication of the Summary Notice;  
12 and (C) Report on Requests for Exclusion and Objections, dated November 5,  
13 2020. Ex. 2 at ¶¶2-7. A total of 158,139 Notice Packets have been mailed as of  
14 November 5, 2020. *Id.* at ¶7. On October 19, 2020, the Summary Notice was  
15 published in *The Wall Street Journal* and was disseminated over the internet using  
16 *PR Newswire*. *Id.* at ¶8 and Exhibits B & C attached thereto. The Notice and  
17 Claim Form were also posted, for review and easy downloading, on the website  
18 established by A.B. Data for purposes of this Settlement, as well as Labaton  
19 Sucharow’s website. *Id.* at ¶10; Johnson Decl. ¶50.

20                   The Notice described, *inter alia*, the claims asserted in the Action, the  
21 contentions of the Parties, the course of the litigation, the terms of the Settlement,  
22 the maximum amounts that would be sought in attorneys’ fees and expenses, the  
23 Plan of Allocation, the right to object to the Settlement, and the right to seek to be  
24 excluded from the Settlement Class. *See generally* Ex. 2-A. The Notice also gave  
25 the deadlines for objecting, seeking exclusion, submitting claims, and advised  
26 potential Settlement Class Members of the scheduled Settlement Hearing before  
27 this Court. *Id.* To date, the Settlement Class’s reaction to the proposed  
28 Settlement has been positive. While the deadline (November 23, 2020) for

1 requesting exclusion or objecting to the Settlement has not yet passed, to date  
2 there has been only one request for exclusion, no objections to the proposed  
3 Settlement, and no objections to the Plan of Allocation.<sup>3</sup>

#### 4 ARGUMENT

### 5 I. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, REASONABLE, AND 6 ADEQUATE AND SHOULD BE APPROVED

#### 7 A. Standards for Final Approval of the Settlement

8 The Ninth Circuit has recognized that there is a “strong judicial policy that  
9 favors settlements, particularly where complex class action litigation is  
10 concerned.” *In re Syncor ERISA Litig.*, 516 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 2008).<sup>4</sup> It  
11 is well established in the Ninth Circuit that “voluntary conciliation and settlement  
12 are the preferred means of dispute resolution.” *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv.*  
13 *Comm’r*, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). Settlements of complex cases, such  
14 as this one, greatly contribute to the efficient utilization of scarce judicial  
15 resources and achieve the speedy resolution of claims. *See, e.g., Garner v. State*  
16 *Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.*, No. CV 08 1365 CW (EMC), 2010 WL 1687832, at \*10  
17 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2010) (“Settlement avoids the complexity, delay, risk and  
18 expense of continuing with the litigation and will produce a prompt, certain and  
19 substantial recovery for the Plaintiff class.”).

20 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) requires court approval of any class  
21 action settlement. The standard for determining whether to grant final approval to  
22 a class action settlement is whether the proposed settlement is “fair, reasonable,  
23 and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). Under the Federal Rules, which were  
24

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25 <sup>3</sup> One request for exclusion has been received but it is not valid as it does not  
26 provide any transactional information establishing membership in the Settlement  
27 Class. Should any objections or additional requests for exclusion be received,  
28 Lead Plaintiff will address them in its reply papers, which are due to be filed with  
the Court on December 7, 2020.

<sup>4</sup> All internal quotations and citations are omitted unless otherwise stated.

1 amended, in pertinent part, in December 2018, a court reviews a settlement using  
2 four main factors. *Id.* They are whether:

3 (A) class representatives and counsel have adequately  
4 represented the class;

5 (B) the proposal was negotiated at arm's length;

6 (C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into  
7 account:

8 (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal;

9 (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of  
10 distributing relief, including the method of processing class-  
11 member claims;

12 (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney's fees,  
13 including timing of payment; and

14 (iv) an agreement required to be identified under Rule  
15 23(e)(3); and

16 (D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to  
17 each other.

18 These standards largely overlap with the pre-amendment factors considered within  
19 the Ninth Circuit: (1) the strength of the plaintiffs' case; (2) the risk, expense,  
20 complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining  
21 class action status throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; (5)  
22 the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; (6) the  
23 experience and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental participant;  
24 and (8) the reaction of the class members of the proposed settlement. *See*  
25 *Churchill Vill. L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec.*, 361 F.3d 566, 575-76 (9th Cir. 2004).  
26 *Accord, Lane v. Facebook, Inc.*, 696 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2012); *Hanlon v.*  
27 *Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998); *see also In re Volkswagen*  
28 *"Clean Diesel" Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig.*, MDL No. 2672

1 CRB (JSC), 2019 WL 2077847, at \*1 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2019) (approving  
2 settlement after considering both the “Rule 23(e)(2) factors, which became  
3 effective on December 1, 2018, and the factors identified in” Ninth Circuit case  
4 law). “[T]o the extent possible the Court would apply the factors listed in Rule  
5 23(e)(2) through the lens of the Ninth Circuit’s factors and existing relevant  
6 precedent.” *Jiangchen v. Rentech, Inc.*, No. CV 17-1490-GW(FFMX), 2019 WL  
7 5173771, at \*4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2019).

8 For the reasons discussed herein and in the Johnson Declaration, the  
9 proposed Settlement meets all the criteria for final approval.

10 **B. Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel Have Adequately Represented**  
11 **the Class and the Settlement Was Negotiated at Arm’s-Length**

12 In determining whether to approve a class action settlement, the Court  
13 should consider “whether the class representatives and class counsel have  
14 adequately represented the class” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(A)) and “whether the  
15 proposal was negotiated at arm’s length (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(B)). “These  
16 considerations overlap with certain Ninth Circuit factors, such as the non-  
17 collusive nature of negotiations, the extent of discovery completed, and the stage  
18 of proceedings.” *In re Extreme Networks*, No. 15-cv-04883, 2019 WL 3290770,  
19 at \*7 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2019) (citing *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1026).

20 **1. Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel Have Adequately**  
21 **Represented the Settlement Class**

22 Lead Plaintiff Kansas City is a sophisticated institutional investor and has  
23 been involved throughout the litigation and supports approval of the Settlement.  
24 *See* Ex. 1. Throughout the Action, Lead Plaintiff benefited from the advice of  
25 knowledgeable counsel well-versed in shareholder class action litigation and  
26 securities fraud cases. Labaton Sucharow LLP is among the most experienced  
27 and skilled firms in the securities litigation field, and has a long and successful  
28 track record in such cases. *See* Ex. 3-D. Lead Counsel has served as lead counsel

1 in a number of high profile and influential cases, including taking three cases to  
2 trial after the enactment of the PSLRA. *Id.*

3       Lead Plaintiff, through Lead Counsel, has vigorously litigated the Action  
4 since its inception four years ago. Lead Counsel, among other things: (i)  
5 conducted a thorough investigation that included the review of publicly available  
6 information issued by or concerning the Company and the events and facts  
7 underlying the claims, including European and domestic emissions regulations,  
8 regulatory submissions by Daimler and other auto manufacturers, investigative  
9 reports regarding diesel emissions and defeat devices, and engineering analyses,  
10 as well as and interviews with more than 30 potential witnesses; (ii) prepared and  
11 filed a detailed Consolidated Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal  
12 Securities Laws (the “Complaint”); (iii) researched and drafted oppositions to  
13 Defendants’ two motions to dismiss; (iv) engaged in contentious and extensive  
14 briefing and oral arguments related to a sealed discovery dispute with Defendants;  
15 (v) prepared briefing on Defendants’ appeal of the Order regarding the sealed  
16 discovery dispute; (vi) worked closely with multiple experts to analyze diesel  
17 emissions, regulatory, data privacy, loss causation, and damages issues; and (vii)  
18 engaged in extensive mediated settlement discussions, which included additional  
19 due diligence prior to executing the Stipulation. *See generally* Johnson Decl. at  
20 §§ III - V.

21       Accordingly, prior to, and over the course of the litigation, Lead Plaintiff  
22 and Counsel explored the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and defenses  
23 and developed a deep understanding of the merits of the claims. They had a firm  
24 understanding of the likelihood of success and the potential for recovery at trial at  
25 the time the Settlement was entered into. *See, e.g., Eisen v. Porsche Cars N. Am.,*  
26 *Inc.*, No. 2:11-cv-09405-CAS-FFMx, 2014 WL 439006, at \*4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30,  
27 2014) (approving settlement where record established that “all counsel had ample  
28 information and opportunity to assess the strengths and weaknesses of their claims



1 and defenses”); *Redwen v. Sino Clean Energy, Inc.*, No. 11-3936, 2013 WL  
2 12303367, at \*7 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2013) (settlement approved when, as here, “the  
3 parties have spent a significant amount of time considering the issues and facts in  
4 this case and are in a position to determine whether settlement is a viable  
5 alternative”); *Destefano v. Zynga Inc.*, No. 12-04007-JSC, 2016 WL 537946, at  
6 \*12 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2016) (noting that the extent of discovery completed and  
7 stage of proceedings supports final approval of settlement where plaintiffs  
8 engaged in a pre-filing investigation, opposed defendants’ motions to dismiss and  
9 a motion for reconsideration, worked with consultants, propounded and responded  
10 to some discovery, and prepared and participated in mediation session).

11 As a result of this process, Lead Counsel and Lead Plaintiff concluded that  
12 the proposed Settlement was fair and reasonable. As the Ninth Circuit observed in  
13 *Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corporation*, Lead Counsel’s informed opinion  
14 supports approval as “[t]his circuit has long deferred to the private consensual  
15 decision of the parties” and their counsel in settling an action. *Rodriguez*, 563  
16 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir. 2009); *see also Nat’l Rural Telecomm. Coop. v. DirectTV,*  
17 *Inc.*, 221 F.R.D. 523, 528 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“[g]reat weight’ is accorded to the  
18 recommendation of counsel, who are most closely acquainted with the facts of the  
19 underlying litigation.”); *In re NVIDIA Corp. Derivative Litig.*, No. 06-cv-06110-  
20 SBA (JCS), 2008 WL 5382544, at \*4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2008) (“[S]ignificant  
21 weight should be attributed to counsel’s belief that settlement is in the best interest  
22 of those affected by the settlement.”). Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted  
23 that Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel have adequately represented the Settlement  
24 Class.

## 25 2. The Settlement Was Negotiated at Arm’s-Length

26 Courts have long recognized that there is an initial presumption that a  
27 proposed settlement is fair and reasonable when it is the product of arms-length  
28 negotiations. *See Roberti v. OSI Sys., Inc.*, No. CV 13-09174MWFMRW, 2015



1 WL 8329916, at \*3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2015) (“The arms-length nature of the  
2 negotiation resulting in the proposed Settlement supports final approval.”); *In re*  
3 *Netflix Privacy Litig.*, No. 5:11cv-00379, 2013 WL 1120801, at \*4 (N.D. Cal.  
4 Mar. 18, 2013) (“Courts have afforded a presumption of fairness and  
5 reasonableness of a settlement agreement where that agreement was the product of  
6 non-collusive, arms’ length negotiations conducted by capable and experienced  
7 counsel”); *cf Jiangchen*, 2019 WL 5173771, at \*6 (finding that the settlement was  
8 the product of “serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations performed at arms-  
9 length” where it involved a mediator and vigorousness litigation).

10 Here, Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel agreed to settle after rigorous  
11 litigation efforts and a through mediation process overseen by a highly regarded  
12 and experienced mediator, the Honorable Daniel Weinstein of JAMS, with  
13 assistance from Ambassador (ret.) David Carden. ¶¶42-44. The mediation, held  
14 on December 19, 2019, involved an extended effort to settle the claims and was  
15 preceded by the submission of mediation statements to the Mediator, addressing  
16 issues of both liability and damages. *Id.* The Parties reached an agreement-in-  
17 principle to settle the Action that day, subject to the negotiation of a mutually  
18 acceptable term sheet and long form stipulation of settlement, as well as the  
19 completion of additional due diligence to confirm the reasonableness of the  
20 Settlement. The Settlement Term Sheet was executed by the Parties on February  
21 20, 2020. Prior to the Parties execution of the Stipulation on April 20, 2020, Lead  
22 Counsel conducted additional due diligence and reviewed more than 2,600  
23 documents produced by Defendants, in both English and German.

24 It is respectfully submitted that this factor supports approval of the  
25 Settlement.

1           **C.     The Relief Provided by the Settlement Is Adequate**

2           In determining whether a class-action settlement is “fair, reasonable, and  
3 adequate,” the Court must also consider whether “the relief provided for the class  
4 is adequate, taking into account . . . the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal,”  
5 as well as other relevant factors. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C). This factor under  
6 Rule 23(e)(2)(C) essentially encompasses four of the seven factors of the  
7 traditional Ninth Circuit analysis: (1) the amount offered in settlement; (2) the  
8 risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of  
9 maintaining class-action status throughout the trial; and (4) the strength of  
10 plaintiffs’ case. *See Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1026.

11           Here, the \$19 million Settlement Amount presents a very favorable  
12 recovery for the Settlement Class. As noted in the Johnson Declaration, it is  
13 estimated that if liability were established with respect to all of the claims,  
14 maximum aggregate damages based on the full stock price declines on the alleged  
15 disclosure dates would be approximately \$150 million (this assumes Lead Plaintiff  
16 does not need to disaggregate, or parse out, confounding non-fraud related  
17 information). ¶69. Accordingly, the Settlement recovers approximately 13% of  
18 maximum damages. *Id.* Courts regularly approve securities settlements that  
19 recover a similar percentage of damages, and even far smaller percentages than  
20 the percentage recovered here. *See, e.g., In re Biolase, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, No. 13-  
21 1300, 2015 WL 12720318, at \*4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2015) (settlement recovery of  
22 8% of estimated damages “equals or surpasses the recovery in many other  
23 securities class actions”); *McPhail v. First Command Fin. Planning, Inc.*, No. 05-  
24 cv-179-IEG-JMA, 2009 WL 839841, at \*5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2009) (finding a  
25 \$12 million settlement recovering 7% of estimated damages was fair and  
26 adequate); *In re Omnivision Techs., Inc.*, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1042 (N.D. Cal.  
27 2008) (\$13.75 million settlement yielding 6% of potential damages after  
28 deducting fees and costs was “higher than the median percentage of investor

1 losses recovered in recent shareholder class action settlements”); *IBEW Local 697*  
2 *Pension Fund v. Int’l Game Tech., Inc.* No. 3:09-cv-00419-MMD-WGC, 2012  
3 WL 5199742, at \*3 (D. Nev. Oct. 19, 2012) (approving \$12.5 million settlement  
4 representing “about 3.5% of the maximum damages that Plaintiffs believe[d]  
5 could be recovered at trial” and finding it “within the median recovery in  
6 securities class actions settled in the last few years”).

7 The \$19 million recovery is also well above the median securities case  
8 settlement amount of \$12.4 million for 2019, as reported by NERA Economic  
9 Consulting. See Janeen McIntosh and Svetlana Starykh, *Recent Trends in*  
10 *Securities Class Action Litigation: 2019 Full-Year Review* (NERA 2020), Ex. 7 at  
11 1.

12 Although Lead Plaintiff believes that the case against Defendants is strong,  
13 that confidence must be tempered by the fact that the Settlement is certain and that  
14 every case involves significant risk of no recovery, particularly in a complex  
15 securities case such as this one.

### 16 **1. Risks in Proving Falsity**

17 The operative complaint in the Action, the Complaint, asserts violations of  
18 Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.  
19 §§78j(b) and 78t(a), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC, 17  
20 C.F.R. §240.10b-5, by Daimler and the Individual Defendants. To succeed on a  
21 Rule 10b-5 claim, based on an untrue statement or omission of a material fact, a  
22 plaintiff must establish (1) a false statement or omission of material fact; (2) made  
23 with scienter; (3) upon which the plaintiff justifiably relied; and (4) that  
24 proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.

25 Here, if the case were to proceed, Defendants likely would continue to  
26 argue that with respect to the element of falsity, the statements they made before  
27 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency issued a Notice of Violation (“NOV”)  
28 to VW for using illegal emissions “defeat devices” were mere corporate optimism,

1 or puffery, which are immaterial as a matter of law. ¶60. Defendants likely would  
2 have maintained their arguments that statements regarding, for example,  
3 Daimler’s compliance with “the strictest emissions standards,” were not false  
4 because its diesel vehicles met the applicable regulatory standards that were in  
5 place at the time. Regarding the alleged misstatements denying that Daimler used  
6 defeat devices after the VW NOV, Defendants would likely continue to contend  
7 that they were not false and misleading because, *inter alia*, Lead Plaintiff would  
8 not be able to establish Daimler’s use of any impermissible defeat device like the  
9 ones used by VW. Additionally, falsity would have been difficult to establish  
10 given the lack of clear regulatory guidance and competing interpretations as to  
11 whether or not an emissions control system that shuts off to protect the vehicle’s  
12 engine (such as the BlueTEC emissions control system) were permissible under  
13 the applicable regulations. ¶61.

14 Defendants also likely would have argued that their statements denying the  
15 use of a defeat device were made in direct response to the revelation of VW’s use  
16 of a specific type of defeat device software that detected if the vehicle was in a  
17 testing environment and otherwise shut off. Defendants likely would have argued  
18 that Daimler’s emissions control systems did not use the same type of software as  
19 VW. Accordingly, Lead Plaintiff faced challenges in establishing that  
20 Defendants’ denials of using a “defeat device” were false given that such  
21 statements were made in the context of responding to questions resulting from the  
22 VW defeat device revelations. ¶62.

23 Overall, there was significant uncertainty concerning Lead Plaintiff’s ability  
24 to establish the element of falsity as the case proceeded through expert discovery,  
25 summary judgment challenges, trial, and inevitable appeals.

## 26 2. Risks in Proving Scienter

27 Lead Plaintiff would also need to prove that Defendants made the allegedly  
28 false and misleading statements with the intent to mislead investors or with

1 deliberate recklessness. As courts have recognized, a defendant’s state of mind in  
2 a securities case “is the most difficult element of proof and one that is rarely  
3 supported by direct evidence.” *See In re Amgen Inc. Sec. Litig.*, No. 07 cv-2536,  
4 2016 WL 10571773, at \*3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2016); *see also In re Immune*  
5 *Response Sec. Litig.*, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1172 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (noting that  
6 scienter is a “complex and difficult [element] to establish at trial”).

7 In this regard, Defendants likely would have continued to argue, *inter alia*,  
8 that none of the Individual Defendants could have been aware of any improper  
9 defeat device given that they were not responsible for developing any of the  
10 complex and vehicle-specific emissions software at issue, nor would such  
11 responsibility be expected given their high-level management positions. ¶63.  
12 Defendants would also likely argue that Lead Plaintiff could not put forth  
13 sufficient evidence to prove that any of the Individual Defendants, or anyone else  
14 whose knowledge could be imputed to Daimler and who participated in making  
15 the challenged statements, knew that Daimler’s emissions systems were non-  
16 compliant with the applicable regulatory standards because, *inter alia*, the  
17 regulatory landscape is complex, not well-defined, and subject to numerous  
18 competing interpretations. ¶64.

19 Accordingly, there was a serious risk that Lead Plaintiff would be unable to  
20 prove scienter.

### 21 3. Risks Concerning Class Certification

22 As detailed in the Johnson Declaration, Lead Plaintiff also faced the risk of  
23 a complex and heavily contested motion for class certification, and of retaining  
24 certification through summary judgment and trial. In this regard, Lead Plaintiff  
25 would have had to counter, and the Court would be called to rule on, complex loss  
26 causation and *Morrison* arguments, and the motion would have led to a difficult  
27 contested “battle of the experts.”

1 Most notably, Defendants likely would have argued that purchases of the  
2 Daimler Securities at issue here—particularly the Daimler GRSs, which are  
3 connected to the U.S. only by their trading on the U.S. OTC market—did not  
4 qualify as domestic transactions under *Morrison* and the guidance set forth in  
5 *Stoyas v. Toshiba Corp.*, 896 F.3d 933, 937 n.1 (9th Cir. 2018). Thus, Lead  
6 Plaintiff would have faced novel and complex challenges in establishing that  
7 purchases of Daimler GRS on the U.S. OTC market were domestic transactions  
8 under *Morrison* and appropriate for class certification. ¶56.

9 Additionally, there was a risk that Defendants would have succeeded in  
10 arguing that one or both of the alleged corrective disclosures did not have price  
11 impact on the Daimler Securities for purposes of rebutting the *Basic v. Levinson*,  
12 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988), presumption of reliance, which also would have  
13 posed a significant risk to achieving and maintaining class certification. ¶57.

#### 14 **4. Risks in Proving Loss Causation and Damages**

15 Another principal challenge in continuing the litigation is the difficulty of  
16 proving loss causation and damages. To succeed at trial in a securities fraud case,  
17 “a plaintiff [must] prove that the defendant’s misrepresentation (or other  
18 fraudulent conduct) proximately caused the plaintiff’s economic loss.” *Dura*  
19 *Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo*, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005). Here, loss causation and  
20 damages would have been hotly contested by Defendants, particularly at class  
21 certification and summary judgment, and would continue to be challenged in  
22 *Daubert* motions, at trial, in post-trial proceedings and appeals.

23 As discussed above, it is estimated that if liability were established with  
24 respect to all of the claims, including for all the alleged corrective disclosures, the  
25 most reasonable estimate of maximum aggregate damages recoverable at trial was  
26 approximately \$150 million, without “parsing out” or disaggregating the impact of  
27 non-fraud related information from the alleged stock price declines. However,  
28 Defendants likely would have continued to argue that the two alleged corrective



1 disclosures (on September 21, 2015 and on April 21, 2016) were not corrective.  
2 Regarding the September 21, 2015 article concerning VW and emissions data,  
3 Defendants would likely argue that it was not corrective because it did not reveal  
4 any defeat device issues with *Daimler's* vehicles. Defendants would also have  
5 likely argued that loss causation was not established for this first alleged  
6 disclosure date because the article was issued during trading hours on September  
7 21, 2015, but there was no statistically significant stock price decline on that day.  
8 ¶¶66-67. With respect to the April 21, 2016 disclosure date, Defendants would  
9 likely continue to argue that the announcement of an internal investigation and  
10 other such expressions of concern about Daimler's emissions controls did not  
11 qualify as a "corrective" disclosure sufficient to establish loss causation because  
12 they did not reveal the alleged fraudulent practices to the market. ¶68.

13       There was also substantial uncertainty surrounding Lead Plaintiff's expert's  
14 ability to isolate the proportion of the stock price declines on the disclosure dates  
15 attributable specifically to the alleged fraud. Defendants likely would assert that  
16 disaggregating information only related to the alleged fraud from the price  
17 declines would necessarily show no damages resulting from Lead Plaintiff's  
18 theory of the case. Because of these challenges, Lead Plaintiff's proposed  
19 damages methodology would have come under sustained attack by Defendants,  
20 and issues relating to damages would likely have come down to an unpredictable  
21 and hotly disputed "battle of the experts." As Courts have long recognized, the  
22 uncertainty as to which side's expert's view might be credited by the jury presents  
23 a substantial litigation risk in securities actions. *See, e.g., Nguyen v. Radiant*  
24 *Pharms. Corp.*, No. SACV 11-00406 DOC (MLGx), 2014 WL 1802293, at \*2  
25 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2014) (approving settlement in securities case where "[p]roving  
26 and calculating damages required a complex analysis, requiring the jury to parse  
27 divergent positions of expert witnesses in a complex area of the law" and "[t]he  
28 outcome of that analysis is inherently difficult to predict and risky"); *In re Celera*



1 *Corp. Sec. Litig.*, No. 5:10-CV-02604-EJD, 2015 WL 7351449, at \*6 (N.D. Cal.  
2 Nov. 20, 2015) (finding that risks related to the “battle of experts” weighed in  
3 favor of settlement approval).

#### 4 **5. The Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further** 5 **Litigation**

6 Final approval of the Settlement is also supported by the complexity,  
7 expense, and likely duration of continued litigation. *See Torrissi v. Tucson Elec.*  
8 *Power Co.*, 8 F.3d 1370, 1376 (9th Cir. 1993) (“the cost, complexity and time of  
9 fully litigating the case all suggest that this settlement was fair”). All the above-  
10 noted risks aside, fact and expert discovery would have been protracted.  
11 Defendants would likely have sought summary judgment with respect to several  
12 elements of Lead Plaintiff’s claims and there was no guarantee that the proposed  
13 class would prevail in Defendants’ continuous challenges and, even if they did,  
14 how the Court’s rulings would affect damages or how the case would be presented  
15 to a jury.

16 A trial of Lead Plaintiff’s claims would inevitably be long and complex,  
17 and even a favorable verdict would undoubtedly spur a lengthy post-trial and  
18 appellate process. *See, e.g., Torrissi*, 8 F.3d at 1376 (“the cost, complexity and  
19 time of fully litigating the case all suggest that this settlement was fair”).  
20 “Generally, unless the settlement is clearly inadequate, its acceptance and  
21 approval are preferable to lengthy and expensive litigation with uncertain results.”  
22 *In re LinkedIn User Privacy Litig.*, 309 F.R.D. 573, 587 (N.D. Cal. 2015).

23 In contrast, the Settlement provides the Settlement Class with a prompt and  
24 substantial tangible recovery, without the considerable risk, expense, and delay of  
25 litigating to completion.

#### 26 **6. The Effective Process for Distributing Relief**

27 The Settlement is also fair, reasonable, and adequate in light of the effective  
28 process for distributing the relief.

1 As set forth in the Stipulation, as amended, and the Preliminary Approval  
2 Order, the proceeds of the Settlement will be distributed to eligible claimants with  
3 the assistance of an experienced claims administrator. *See* Stipulation at ¶¶22-31;  
4 Preliminary Approval Order ¶13. The Claims Administrator will employ a well-  
5 established protocol for the processing of claims in a securities class action.  
6 Potential class members will submit, either by mail or online using the Settlement  
7 website, the Court-approved Claim Form. Based on trading information provided  
8 by claimants, the Claims Administrator will determine each claimant’s eligibility  
9 to participate and calculate their respective “Recognized Claims” based on the  
10 Court-approved Plan of Allocation. Lead Plaintiff’s claims will be reviewed in  
11 the same manner. Claimants will be notified of any defects or conditions of  
12 ineligibility and be given the chance to contest rejection. Any claim disputes that  
13 cannot be resolved will be presented to the Court for a determination.

14 After the Settlement reaches its Effective Date (Stipulation at ¶39) and the  
15 passing of all applicable deadlines, Authorized Claimants will be issued payments.  
16 After an initial distribution of the Net Settlement Fund, if there is any balance  
17 remaining (whether by reason of tax refunds, uncashed checks or otherwise) after  
18 at least six (6) months from the date of initial distribution of the Net Settlement  
19 Fund, the Claims Administrator will, if feasible and economical after payment of  
20 Notice and Administration Expenses, Taxes, and attorneys’ fees and expenses, if  
21 any, redistribute the balance among Authorized Claimants who have cashed their  
22 checks in an equitable and economic fashion. *See* Ex. 2 - A ¶61. Once Lead  
23 Counsel, in consultation with the Claims Administrator, believes it is no longer  
24 feasible or economical to make further distributions of the Net Settlement Fund to  
25 Authorized Claimants, and has sought Court approval to cease making  
26 distributions if required to do so as explained below, the balance that still remains  
27 in the Net Settlement Fund after such re-distribution(s) and after payment of  
28 outstanding Notice and Administration Expenses, Taxes, and attorneys’ fees and

1 expenses, if any, will be contributed, in equal shares, to The Council of  
2 Institutional Investors and Consumer Federation of America, or such other non  
3 profit and non-sectarian organization(s) approved by the Court. If the unclaimed  
4 balance is \$20,000 or more, Lead Counsel must seek Court approval before  
5 ceasing to make distributions and making the *cy pres* donation. *See* Agreement  
6 Regarding Amendments ¶2; Ex. 2-A at ¶61.

7 **7. The Attorney’s Fees and Expense Requests Are Reasonable**

8 As set forth in the accompanying motion, Lead Counsel is requesting  
9 attorneys’ fees of 25% of the Settlement Fund and litigation expenses of  
10 \$150,686.35. A fee request of 25% is the “benchmark” within the Ninth Circuit  
11 and is consistent with numerous settlements approved in the Ninth Circuit. *See,*  
12 *e.g., Torrasi*, 8 F.3d at 1376-77 (reaffirming 25% benchmark); *Powers v. Eichen*,  
13 229 F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); *see also Zynga*, 2016 WL 537946, at  
14 \*16 (“In common fund cases in the Ninth Circuit, the ‘benchmark’ percentage  
15 award is 25 percent of the recovery obtained, with 20 to 30 percent as the usual  
16 range.”) (citing *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1047). The Settlement is not contingent  
17 upon any particular award to Lead Counsel, which is within the discretion of the  
18 Court.

19 **8. The Relief Provided Is Adequate Taking Into Account**  
20 **All Agreements Related to the Settlement**

21 The relief provided to the Settlement Class is also adequate under Rule  
22 23(e)(2)(C)(iv) given that all the agreements under Rule 23(e)(3) treat the  
23 Settlement Class fairly.

24 On February 20, 2020, the Parties executed the Settlement Term Sheet. On  
25 April 20, 2020, the Parties formally memorialized the Settlement in the  
26 Stipulation. Also as of April 20, 2020, they entered into a confidential  
27 Supplemental Agreement Regarding Requests for Exclusion (“Supplemental  
28 Agreement”), which was submitted to the Court under seal. The Supplemental

1 Agreement sets forth the conditions under which Defendants have the discretion  
2 to terminate the Settlement if requests for exclusion from the Settlement Class  
3 exceed a certain agreed-upon threshold. As is standard in securities settlements,  
4 the Supplemental Agreement has been kept confidential in order to avoid  
5 incentivizing the formation of a group of opt-outs for the sole purpose of  
6 leveraging a larger individual settlement.

7 On September 14, 2020, the Parties amended Paragraphs 21 and 26 of the  
8 Stipulation through the Agreement Regarding Amendments. The Settlement  
9 Term Sheet, Stipulation, Supplemental Agreement, and the Agreement Regarding  
10 Amendments, are the only agreements concerning the Settlement entered into by  
11 the Parties. All the agreements treat the Settlement Class fairly and support a  
12 finding that the relief provided by the Settlement is adequate.

13 **D. Settlement Class Members Are Treated Equitably Relative to**  
14 **One Another and the Proposed Plan of Allocation Should Be**  
15 **Approved**

16 The Plan of Allocation, drafted with the assistance of Lead Plaintiff's  
17 damages expert, is a fair, reasonable, and adequate method for allocating the  
18 proceeds of the Settlement among eligible claimants and treats all Settlement  
19 Class Members equitably, as required by Rule 23(e)(2)(D). Each Authorized  
20 Claimant, including Lead Plaintiff, will receive a distribution pursuant to the Plan,  
21 and Lead Plaintiff will be subject to the same formula for distribution of the  
22 Settlement as other class members. *See Ciuffitelli v. Deloitte & Touche LLP*, No.  
23 16CV00580, 2019 WL 1441634, at \*18 (D. Or. Mar. 19, 2019) (“[t]he Proposed  
24 Settlement does not provide preferential treatment to Plaintiffs or segments of the  
25 class” where “the proposed Plan of Allocation compensates all Class Members  
26 and Class Representatives equally in that they will receive a pro rata distribution  
27 based [sic] of the Settlement Fund based on their net losses”).

28 The standard for approval of a plan of allocation in a class action under  
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the same as the standard

1 applicable to the settlement as a whole – the plan must be fair, reasonable, and  
2 adequate. *Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle*, 955 F.2d 1268, 1284 (9th Cir. 1992);  
3 *Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1045. An allocation formula need only have a  
4 reasonable basis, particularly if recommended by experienced class counsel. *In re*  
5 *Heritage Bond Litig.*, No. 02-ML-1475, 2005 WL 1594403, at \*11 (C.D. Cal.  
6 June 10, 2005). “[A] plan of allocation . . . fairly treats class members by  
7 awarding a pro rata share to every Authorized Claimant, even as it sensibly makes  
8 interclass distinctions based upon, inter alia, the relative strengths and weaknesses  
9 of class members’ individual claims and the timing of purchases of the securities  
10 at issue.” *Redwen*, 2013 WL 12303367, at \*8.

11 Here, Lead Plaintiff’s consulting damages expert prepared the Plan of  
12 Allocation after careful consideration of Lead Plaintiff’s theories of liability and  
13 damages under the Exchange Act. The Plan provides for distribution of the Net  
14 Settlement Fund among Authorized Claimants on a *pro rata* basis based on  
15 “Recognized Loss” formulas tied to liability and damages. These formulas  
16 consider the amount of alleged artificial inflation in the price changes in Daimler  
17 American Depository Receipts and/or Global Registered Shares in the United  
18 States, as quantified by the consulting damages expert.

19 Individual claimants’ recoveries will depend upon when during the Class  
20 Period they purchased and/or acquired a Daimler Security. Claimants’  
21 Recognized Losses will be calculated according to the Plan of Allocation using  
22 the transactional information provided by claimants in their claim forms.  
23 Authorized Claimants will recover their proportional “*pro rata*” amount of the Net  
24 Settlement Fund based on their total Recognized Losses. Accordingly, the Plan of  
25 Allocation will result in a fair distribution of the available proceeds among  
26 Settlement Class Members who submit valid claims. The Plan of Allocation was  
27 fully described in the Notice and, to date, there has been no objection to the  
28 proposed plan. *See* Ex. 2-A at 8-14.

1           **E.     Reaction of the Settlement Class to Date**

2           As described above, pursuant to this Court’s Preliminary Approval Order,  
3 158,139 copies of the Notice and Claim Form were mailed to potential Settlement  
4 Class Members who could be identified with reasonable effort. *See* Ex. 2 at ¶¶2-  
5 7. The Summary Notice was published in *The Wall Street Journal* and transmitted  
6 over the internet using *PRNewswire* on October 19, 2020. *Id.* at ¶8. Additionally,  
7 the Stipulation, Agreement Regarding Amendments, Notice, Claim Form, and  
8 Preliminary Approval Order were posted to the website dedicated to the  
9 Settlement (*id.* at ¶10), as well as Lead Counsel’s website.

10           The Notice advised the Settlement Class of, among other things, the terms  
11 of the Settlement, the Plan of Allocation, and the maximum amount of Lead  
12 Counsel’s request for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses, as well as the  
13 procedures and deadlines for filing objections and requesting exclusion from the  
14 Settlement Class by November 23, 2020. *See generally* Ex. 2-A.

15           The Ninth Circuit has held that notice must be “reasonably calculated,  
16 under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the  
17 action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” *Mendoza v.*  
18 *Tucson Sch. Dist. No. 1*, 623 F.2d 1338, 1351 (9th Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit  
19 has also ruled that the objection deadline should fall after motions in support of  
20 approval and attorneys’ fees and expenses have been filed. *See, e.g., In re*  
21 *Mercury Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 618 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2010) (requiring that  
22 fee motion be made available to the class before the deadline for objecting to the  
23 fee). Lead Plaintiff respectfully submits that the notice program utilized here  
24 readily meets these standards.

25           While the objection/exclusion deadline – November 23, 2020 – has not yet  
26 passed, to date, no objections and only one invalid exclusion request has been  
27 received. ¶51; Ex. 2 at ¶¶11-12. The reaction to date supports approval of the  
28



1 Settlement and the proposed Plan of Allocation. Lead Plaintiff will address  
2 objections and additional requests for exclusion, if any, in its reply submission.

3 **II. FINAL CERTIFICATION OF THE SETTLEMENT CLASS**

4 The Court previously granted preliminary certification to the Settlement  
5 Class under Rules 23(a) and (b)(3). See ECF No. 325. Because nothing has  
6 occurred since then to cast doubt on the propriety of class certification for  
7 settlement purposes, and no objections to certification have been received to date,  
8 the Court should grant final class certification.

9 **CONCLUSION**

10 For all the foregoing reasons, Lead Plaintiff respectfully requests that the  
11 Court: (i) grant final approval of the Settlement; (ii) finally certify the Settlement  
12 Class, for settlement purposes only; and (iii) approve the proposed Plan of  
13 Allocation as fair, reasonable, and adequate. Proposed orders, including the  
14 Judgment negotiated by the Parties as part of the Settlement, are filed herewith.

15  
16 Dated: November 9, 2020

**LABATON SUCHAROW LLP**

17  
18 Bv: /s/ James W. Johnson  
19 JAMES W. JOHNSON (*pro hac vice*)  
20 MICHAEL H. ROGERS (*pro hac vice*)  
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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on November 9, 2020, I authorized the electronic filing of the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the e-mail addresses denoted on the attached Electronic Mail Notice List via ECF to all registered participants.

I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on November 9, 2020

/s/ James W. Johnson  
James W. Johnson

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